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Abstract
This paper deals with the implications of factor demand linkages for monetary
policy design. We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with two sectors
that produce durable and non-durable goods, respectively. Part of the output of
each sector serves as a production input in both sectors, in accordance with a realis-
tic input-output structure. Strategic complementarities induced by factor demand
linkages signicantly alter the transmission of exogenous shocks and amplify the
loss of social welfare under optimal monetary policy, compared to what is observed
in standard two-sector models. The distinction between value added and gross
output that naturally arises in this context is of key importance to explore the wel-
fare properties of the model economy. A exible ination targeting regime is close
to optimal only if the central bank balances ination and value added variability.
Otherwise, targeting gross output variability entails a substantial increase in the
loss of welfare.
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Introduction
This paper deals with the implications of factor demand linkages for monetary policy
design. We build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with two
sectors that produce durable and non-durable goods. The gross output of each sector
serves either as a nal consumption good, or as an intermediate input in both sectors,
according to an input-output matrix calibrated on the US economy.
Introducing factor demand linkages into otherwise standard general equilibrium mod-
els with durable and non-durable consumption goods is of key importance. It is well doc-
umented that standard sticky-price models incorporating sectoral heterogeneity in price
stickiness - usually in the form of sticky non-durable goods prices and exible durables
prices - cannot generate positive co-movement between sectors following a monetary pol-
icy innovation (Barsky et al., 2007). As argued by various contributions (see, among
others, Aoki et al., 2004; Erceg and Levin, 2006; Barsky et al., 2007), co-movement be-
tween non-durable and durable consumption is an inherent feature of the US economy
that multi-sector DSGE models need to be able to replicate. Recently, Bouakez, Car-
dia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Sudo (2008) have shown that factor demand linkages
are able to generate positive co-movement between non-durable and durable spending.1
However, none of these papers takes a normative perspective. Input-output interactions
are empirically relevant and play an important role in the transmission of shocks across
sectors.2 As such, they should be accounted for in designing the optimal monetary policy
for a multi-sector framework. The key contribution of this paper is to explore how mon-
etary policy should be pursued in a model with cross-industry ows of input materials.
We show four main results.
First, the monetary authority cannot attain the Pareto optimal allocation consistent
with the full stabilization of output and ination, even in the absence of distortions in
the labor market (imperfect labor mobility) and the goods market (monopolistic competi-
tion). The consumption of intermediate goods by both sectors imposes a more restrictive
set of conditions to the full stabilization of the model economy in the face of exogenous
shocks, compared to models where sectors of production do not employ input materials
(e.g., Erceg and Levin, 2006) or are connected through a vertical trading chain (e.g.,
Huang and Liu, 2005).
Second, we explore optimal monetary policy under the assumption that the policy
maker can credibly commit to a policy rule derived from the minimization of a social
welfare function. We follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and obtain a quadratic
approximation to the utility function of the representative household. The welfare crite-
rion balances, along with sectoral ination variability, a preference to smooth durables
accumulation and reduce uctuations in aggregate consumption (or, equivalently, value
1Horvath (1998, 2000) and Carvalho (2009) show that cross-industry ows of input materials can re-
inforce the e¤ect of sectoral shocks, generating aggregate uctuations and co-movement between sectors,
as originally hinted by Long and Plosser (1983). Kim and Kim (2006) show that a similar mechanism
generates widespread co-movement of economic activity (e.g. in employment) across sectors. See also
Hornstein and Praschnik (1997).
2Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008) report evidence on the empirical relevance of input-
output interactions. Dale Jorgensons data on input expenditures by US industries show that materials
(including energy) account for roughly 50% of outlays, while labor and capital account for 34% and
16%, respectively. The Input-Output accounts compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) show
that 70% of the material-input expenditures by the durables sector goes into goods produced by the
nondurables sector. The converse proportion is around 10%, which is much smaller but still not negligible.
2
added). Given the natural distinction between consumption and production in the pres-
ence of input materials, it is no longer irrelevant whether the monetary authority targets
the output gap or the consumption gap. This result has important implications for both
the transmission of exogenous shocks and the selection of policy regimes as alternatives
to the optimal policy under commitment.
Third, introducing factor demand linkages into an otherwise standard two-sector
model amplies the loss of social welfare and alters the transmission of shocks to the
system, compared to the benchmark economy without input materials. A distinctive
feature of the model is that a technology shock to either sector also a¤ects potential
output in the other sector, even if preferences over di¤erent types of consumption goods
are separable. This results in an amplication of the consumption gap response in the
sector hit by the shock and an attenuation in the other sector, compared to models where
sectors are not related through input-output linkages. Furthermore, factor demand link-
ages imply that the relative price of non-durable goods not only a¤ects the marginal rate
of substitution between durable and non-durable consumption, but also exerts a positive
(negative) impact on the real marginal cost in the durable (non-durable) goods sector.
The relative magnitude of these e¤ects depends on the o¤-diagonal elements in the input-
output matrix. Consequently, the intermediate input channel modies the transmission
of positive sectoral cost-push shocks in two main respects, compared to what we conven-
tionally observe in models without factor demand linkages: (i) the deationary e¤ect in
the sector which is not hit by the shock is attenuated and (ii) the drop in the demand
for both classes of consumption goods is amplied.
Fourth, we compare the welfare properties of the model under the optimal policy and
various alternative loss functions. A exible ination targeting regime delivers a wel-
fare loss close to that attained under the optimal policy. Most importantly, the central
bank attains a smaller loss when uctuations in aggregate (or core) ination are balanced
with those in real value added, compared to the loss induced by targeting gross output.
We also consider the case of asymmetric price stickiness, which implies a natural diver-
gence between core and aggregate ination. Although such a di¤erence is still relevant
within our framework, targeting either core or aggregate ination makes little di¤erence
in terms of welfare loss. By contrast, what matters is the term capturing real volatility:
in this respect, targeting the consumption gap entails substantial benets compared to
targeting the production gap. Once again these results emphasize the distinction between
consumption and production that naturally arises in this class of models.
Beyond reconciling conventional two-sector DSGE models with a realistic structure
of the economy and with the empirical evidence on the transmission of monetary shocks,
as in Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Sudo (2008), the key contribution
of this paper is to detect important di¤erences between the way monetary policy should
be pursued and what is otherwise prescribed by the existing literature on multi-sector
models without factor demand linkages. As in Erceg and Levin (2006), an interest rate
rule targeting aggregate variables can closely approximate the optimal policy. However,
targeting the production gap rather than the consumption gap may entail a substantial
loss of welfare.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 1 introduces the theo-
retical setting; Section 2 reports the calibration of our model economy and shows how
co-movement between durable and non-durable consumption emerges following a shock
to an instrumental policy rule; Section 3 discusses the Pareto optimal outcome; Section
4 discusses the implementation of the optimal monetary policy under commitment and
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compares the resulting loss of social welfare with that attainable under a number of al-
ternative policy regimes. We also consider optimal monetary policy under asymmetric
degrees of competition and price stickiness between sectors. Section 5 concludes.
1 The Model
We develop a DSGE model with two sectors that produce durable and non-durable goods,
respectively. The model economy is populated by a large number of innitely-lived house-
holds. Each of these is endowed with one unit of time and derives utility from the con-
sumption of durable goods, non-durable goods and leisure. The two sectors of production
are connected through factor demand linkages.3 Goods produced in each sector serve ei-
ther as a nal consumption good, or as an intermediate production input in both sectors.
The net ow of intermediate goods between sectors depends on the input-output structure
of the production side.
1.1 Producers
Consider an economy that consists of two distinct sectors producing durable (sector d)
and non-durable goods (sector n). Each sector is composed of a continuum of rms
producing di¤erentiated products. Let Y nt (Y
d
t ) denote gross output of the non-durable
(durable) goods sector:
Y it =
"Z 1
0
 
Y ift
 "it 1
"it df
# "it
"it 1
; i = fn; dg (1)
where "it denotes the time-varying elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods
in the production composite of sector i = fn; dg. Each production composite is produced
in the "aggregator" sector operating under perfect competition. It is possible to show
that a generic rm f in sector i faces the following demand schedule:
Y ift =
 
P ift
P it
! "it
Y it ; i = fn; dg (2)
where P it is the price of the composite good in the i
th sector. From (1) and (2) the
relationship between the rm-specic and the sector-specic price is:
P it =
Z 1
0
 
P ift
1 "it df 11 "it ; i = fn; dg : (3)
Sectors are related by factor demand linkages. Part of the output of each sector serves
as an intermediate input in both sectors. The allocation of output produced in the ith
sector is such that:
Y it = C
i
t +M
in
t +M
id
t ; i = fn; dg (4)
3Throughout the paper we will refer to factor demand linkages as indicating cross-industry ows of
input materials. If a specic feature of the framework is essentially determined by the use of intermediate
goods in the production process (i.e., inter-sectoral relationships are not essential) we will explicitly refer
to input materials.
4
where Cit denotes the amount of consumption goods produced by sector i, whileM
in
t (M
id
t )
is the amount of goods produced in sector i and used as input materials in sector n (d).
The production technology of a generic rm f in sector i is:
Y ift = Z
i
t
" 
Mnift
ni  Mdiftdi

ni
ni 
di
di
#i  
Lift
1 i ; i = fn; dg (5)
where Zit (i = fn; dg) is a sector-specic productivity shock, Liftdenotes the number of
hours worked in the fth rm of sector i,M jift (j = fn; dg) denotes material inputs produced
in sector j and supplied to rm f in sector i. Moreover, ij (i; j = fn; dg) denotes the
generic element of the (2  2) input-output matrix,  , and corresponds to the steady
state share of total intermediate goods used in the production of sector j and supplied
by sector i. The input-output matrix is normalized, so that the elements of each column
sum up to one:
P
j=fn;dg nj = 1 (and
P
j=fn;dg dj = 1).
Note that production does not employ physical capital and that input materials sup-
plied by the durable goods sector fully depreciate within the period. However, we allow
consumers to store durable goods from which they derive a ow of services.4
Material inputs are combined according to a CES aggregator:
M jift =
Z 1
0
 
M jikf;t
("jt 1)="jt dk"jt=("jt 1) ; (6)
where

M jikf;t
	
k2[0;1] is a sequence of intermediate inputs produced in sector j by rm k,
which are employed in the production process of rm f in sector i.
Firms in both sectors set prices given the demand functions reported in (2). They
are also assumed to be able to adjust their price with probability 1   i in each period.
When they are able to do so, they set the price that maximizes expected prots:
max
P ift
Et
1X
s=0
(i)
s
t+s

P ift+s (1 +  i) MCift+s

Y ift+s; i = fn; dg (7)
where 
t+s is the stochastic discount factor (consistent with householdsmaximizing
behavior, which is described in the next subsection),  i is a subsidy to producers in
sector i, while MCifs denotes the marginal cost of production of rm f in sector i. The
optimal pricing choice, given the sequence

P nt ; P
d
t ; Y
n
t ; Y
d
t
	
, reads as:
P
i
ft =
"it
("it   1) (1 +  i)
Et
P1
s=0(i)
s
t+sMC
i
ft+sY
i
ft+s
Et
P1
s=0(i)
s
t+sY ift+s
; i = fn; dg : (8)
Note that assuming time-varying elasticities of substitution translates into sectoral cost-
push shocks that allow us to account for sector-specic shift parameters in the supply
4In Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Sudo (2008) durables used as intermediate inputs
are also modeled as fully depreciating goods on the production side. The BLS in the US publishes two
di¤erent input-output tables: (i) the "input-use" table, which considers goods that fully depreciate in
the same period they are produced, and are usually referred to as "materials" in the traditional KLEM
setting; (ii) the "capital ow" table of the input-output accounts, that refers to input materials used as
investment goods. Our   is calibrated according to the "Input-use" table. It is important to stress that
what we usually dene as durables producing sectors have non-zero entries in the input-use matrix, even
though the non-durables sector is still the main supplier of input materials.
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schedules.
In every period each rm solves a cost minimization problem to meet demand at
its stated price. The rst order conditions from this problem result in the following
relationships:
MCiftY
i
ft =
W itL
i
ft
1  i =
P nt M
ni
ft
ini
=
P dt M
di
ft
idi
; i = fn; dg : (9)
It is useful to express the sectoral real marginal cost as a function of the relative price,
Qt = P
n
t =P
d
t ; and the sectoral real wage:
MCnt
P nt
=

n

Q
 dn
t
n
(RW nt )
1 n
Znt
; (10)
where RW nt = W
n
t =P
n
t is the real wage in sector n, and 
n
is a convolution of the
production parameters (
i
= ii (1  i)1 i, i = fn; dg). Analogously, for the durable
goods sector:
MCdt
P dt
=

d
(Q
nd
t )
d
 
RW dt
1 d
Zdt
: (11)
where RW dt = W
d
t =P
d
t .
From (10) and (11) it is clear that the relative price exerts a direct e¤ect on the real
marginal cost of each sector, whose magnitude depends on the size of the cross-industry
ows of input materials.5 Specically, for the ith sector the absolute impact of Qt on
MCit=P
i
t is related to the "importance" of the other sector as input supplier, i.e. on
the magnitude of the o¤-diagonal elements in the input-output matrix (nd and dn).
This is a distinctive feature of the framework we deal with. By contrast, in traditional
multi-sector models without factor demand linkages (e.g., Erceg and Levin, 2006), the
relative price only a¤ects the real marginal cost indirectly, through the marginal rate of
substitution between di¤erent consumption goods.6
1.2 Consumers
Households derive income from working in the production sectors, investing in bonds,
and from the stream of prots generated in the production sectors. Their preferences
are dened over a composite of non-durable goods (Cnt ), an "e¤ective" stock of durable
goods (Dt), and labor (Lt). They maximize the expected present discounted value of
5In a multi-sector setting it is not realistic to consider the case of a diagonal input-output matrix,
so that input materials are produced and employed within the same sector by means of a roundabout
input-output structure. In such cases, a higher share of intermediate goods dampens the impact of the
real wage on the real marginal cost, hereby increasing strategic complementarity in price-setting among
rms in the same sector. In turn this may determine large output e¤ects in the face of a disturbance
to nominal spending (see Basu, 1995; Woodford, 2003, pp. 170-173). This e¤ect is still at work within
the general structure we envisage. In addition, cross-industry ows of input materials induce strategic
complementarities between sectors (Horvath, 1998).
6Similarly, in a model with vertical input linkages, the relative price only exerts a direct e¤ect on the
real marginal cost of the nal goods sector. Nevertheless, it can still be related to the real marginal cost
of the intermediate goods sector through the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure (see Huang and Liu, 2005; Strum, 2009).
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their utility:
E0
1X
t=0
t

H1 t
1     %
L1+vt
1 + v

; (12)
where Ht = (Cnt )
n D
d
t and  is the discount factor, n and d(= 1   n) denote the
expenditure shares on non-durable and durable goods,  is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, v is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Durable
goods are accumulated according to the following law of motion:
Dt = C
d
t + (1  )Dt 1; (13)
where  is the depreciation factor. The e¤ective stock of durables scales the e¤ect of a
quadratic cost of adjustment (see, e.g., Bernanke, 1985):7
Dt = Dt   
2
(Dt  Dt 1)2
D
;   0 (14)
where D denotes the steady state stock of durable consumption goods.
We assume that labor can be either supplied to sector n or d according to a CES
aggregator:
Lt =
h
 
1
 (Lnt )
1+
 + (1  )  1  Ldt  1+ i 1+ ; (15)
where  denotes the elasticity of substitution in labor supply, and  is the steady state
ratio of labor supply in the non-durable goods sector over total labor supply (i.e.,  =
Ln=L). This functional form conveniently allows us to account for di¤erent degrees of
labor mobility between sectors, depending on .8 For  = 0 labor is prevented from
moving across sectors. For  = 1 workers devote all time to the sector paying the
highest wage. Hence, at the margin, all sectors pay the same hourly wage and perfect
labor mobility is attained. For  < 1 hours worked are not perfect substitutes. An
interpretation of this is that workers have a preference for diversity of labor and would
prefer working closer to an equal number of hours in each sector even in the presence of
wage di¤erences across sectors.9 However, an important di¤erence between (15) and the
CES aggregator used by Horvath (2000) is that the former allows us to neutralize the
impact of labor market frictions in the steady state.
The following sequence of (nominal) budget constraints applies:X
i=fn;dg
P itC
i
t +Bt = Rt 1Bt 1 +
X
i=fn;dg
W itL
i
t +
X
i=fn;dg
	it   Tt; (16)
7The inclusion of a cost of adjustment of the stock of durables allows us to obtain results in line
with the empirical evidence on the behavior of durable consumption over the business cycle. King and
Thomas (2006) show how the partial adjustment mechanism helps at accounting for the aggregate e¤ects
of discrete and occasional changes in durables consumption at the microeconomic level. Adda and Cooper
(2000) provide evidence on the discrete nature of durables purchases at the individual level.
8Empirical evidence suggests that labor and capital are not perfectly mobile across sectors. Davis
and Haltiwanger (2001) nd limited labor mobility across sectors in response to monetary and oil shocks.
Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008) report evidence suggesting that perfect labor mobility across
sectors, with its implication that sectoral nominal wages are the same (at the margin), is an imperfect
characterization of the data.
9Horvath (2000) motivates a similar specication based on the desire to capture some degree of sector-
specicity to labor while not deviating from the representative consumer/worker assumption. In a similar
vein, we conveniently employ this mechanism to allow for imperfect labor mobility between sectors.
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where Bt denotes a one-period risk-free nominal bond remunerated at the gross risk-free
rate Rt, and Tt denotes a lump-sum tax paid to the government. The term 	nt + 	
d
t
captures the nominal ow of dividends from both sectors of production.
The following relationship can be retrieved from the rst order conditions of con-
sumersutility maximization with respect to Lnt and L
d
t :
10


1  
  1


Lnt
Ldt
 1

=
W nt
W dt
: (17)
Notice that, as  ! 1 (and perfect labor mobility is attained), sectoral nominal wages
are equalized.
1.3 The Government and the Monetary Authority
The government serves two purposes in the economy. First, it delegates monetary policy
to an independent central bank. We assume that the short-term nominal interest rate is
used as the instrument of monetary policy and that the policy maker is able to pre-commit
to a time-invariant rule. We consider alternative specications of the monetary policy
rule, including both rules that can be regarded as reasonable characterizations of the
recent historical experience (Section 2), and rules derived from an explicit optimization
problem from the perspective of a benevolent central banker (Section 4).
The second task of the government consists of taxing households and providing sub-
sidies to rms to eliminate distortions arising from monopolistic competition in the mar-
kets for both classes of consumption goods. This task is pursued via lump-sum taxes that
maintain a balanced scal budget.
1.4 Market Clearing
Total production reads as:
Yt = Y
n
t + Y
d
t : (18)
The allocation of output produced by each sector requires that sectoral gross output is
partly sold on the markets for consumption goods, while a proportion is sold on the
markets for input materials. Therefore, (4) must be met in each sector.
It is important to recognize that Cit and Y
i
t are not equivalent in our setting. Speci-
cally, Cit can be interpreted as value added in the i
th sector, while Y it is the sectoral gross
output.11 As sectoral gross output can be sold on both the intermediate goods market
and the nal goods market, total production is typically greater than real value added.
Thus, according to our model economy, Cit most closely matches the empirically relevant
denition of value added (or GDP).
2 Solution and Calibration
To solve the model, we log-linearize behavioral equations and resource constraints around
the non-stochastic steady state and then take the deviation from their counterparts un-
10These are reported in Appendix A.
11See also Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) on this distinction in multi-sector models with input mate-
rials.
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der exible prices. The di¤erence between log-variables under sticky prices and their
linearized steady state is denoted by the symbol "^", while we use symbol "" to denote
percent deviations of variables in the e¢ cient equilibrium (i.e., exible prices and con-
stant elasticities of substitution) from the corresponding steady state value. Finally, we
use symbol "~" to denote the di¤erence between linearized variables under sticky prices
and their counterparts in the e¢ cient equilibrium.12
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. We assume that the discount factor
 = 0:993. We set  = 1, a value in line with Ngai and Pissarides (2007) which implies
separability in the utility derived from di¤erent consumption goods. The expenditure
share on non-durable goods is n = 0:682. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply (v) is set to 3, while  = 1, which reects limited labor mobility.13 The production
parameters n = d = 0:6, while the entries of the two-sector input-use matrix are such
that nn = 0:899 and nd = 0:688,
14 according to the calibration of the US economy
used by Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2008).15 These values imply a positive net
ow of input materials from the non-durable goods sector to the durable goods sector.
The depreciation rate of the stock of durables is assumed at 2:5%.16 In the baseline
calibration we assume that the degree of nominal rigidity is the same across sectors, with
n = d = 0:75. We will also allow for asymmetric degrees of price stickiness between
the two sectors at di¤erent stages of the analysis. We assume that sectoral elasticities of
substitution have a steady state value equal to 11. Finally, we set  = 600, as in Erceg
and Levin (2006).
As discussed above, the system features two sector-specic technology shocks, znt and
zdt . The cost-push shocks, 
n
t and 
d
t , are reduced-form expressions for the time-varying
cost-shift parameters in the sectoral New Keynesian Phillips curves. Exogenous variables
are assumed to follow a rst-order stationary VAR with iid innovations and diagonal
covariance matrix. We set the parameters capturing the persistence and variance of the
productivity growth stochastic processes so that z
n
= z
d
= 0:95 and z
n
= z
d
=
0:02, respectively. These values are consistent with the empirical evidence showing that
technology shocks are generally small, but highly persistent (see Cooley and Prescott,
1995; Huang and Liu, 2005). As to the cost-push shocks, we follow Jensen (2002), Walsh
(2003) and Strum (2009), and assume that these are purely transitory, with 
n
= 
d
=
0:02.
2.1 Co-movement in the Face of a Monetary Policy Shock
Prior to exploring equilibrium dynamics under optimal monetary policy it is instructive
to show how this model di¤ers from one without factor demand linkages. To close the
model at this stage, it is necessary to specify how the monetary authority sets the nominal
12Steady state conditions are reported in Appendix B. Appendix C reports the economy under exible
prices. The linearized system in extensive form is reported in Appendix D.
13This value is in line with the calibration proposed by Horvath (2000).
14This implies that the marginal impact of changes in the relative price on the real sectoral marginal
cost is, in absolute value, higher for the durable goods sector, as n = d and nd  dn.
15These shares have been computed using the table "The Use of Commodities by Industries" for 1992
produced by the BLS. Sudo (2008) shows that the matrix is fairly stable over time.
16As in Erceg and Levin (2006), this choice reects that the durables sector in our model includes
both consumer durables and residential investment, which have quarterly depreciation rates of about 5%
and 0.75%, respectively, and that the expenditure share of consumer durables in the composite is about
two-thirds.
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rate of interest. In the rst instance, and for illustration purposes only, we consider the
following instrumental rule:17
brt = rbrt 1 + (1  r)t + urt ;  > 0 and 0  r  1 (19)
where urt is an iid (0; 1) monetary policy innovation. The interest rate-smoothing para-
meter, r, is set to 0:7, while  = 1:5. We assume that the monetary authority responds
to a convex combination of the sector-specic rates of ination. The corresponding price
index is ept = epnt +(1 )epdt , where the weights assigned to sectoral prices are determined
by the relative size of each sector.
Figure 1 reports the e¤ects of a one-standard-deviation shock to the monetary policy
rule, for various frequencies of adjustment in the price of durables (the degree of stickiness
in the non-durable sector is kept constant at four quarters). Factor demand linkages
induce co-movement in durable and non-durable goods spending. Durable and non-
durable consumption decrease following the monetary contraction and gradually return to
their equilibrium level thereafter.18 Moreover, in accordance with the empirical evidence
produced by Erceg and Levin (2006), the sensitivity of durable spending to the monetary
innovation is larger than that of non-durable spending, despite the introduction of an
adjustment cost of the e¤ective stock of durables. This e¤ect is more pronounced as the
stickiness of durable goods prices increases.
When factor demand linkages are ruled out and prices in the durable goods sector are
exible, as reported in the right-hand panel of Figure 1, durable consumption increases,
while non-durable consumption mirrors its path in the opposite direction.19 This negative
co-movement is induced by the assumption of price exibility in the durables sector, as
opposed to the assumption of price stickiness in the non-durables sector, which implies
that the relative price of durables decreases following the initial monetary contraction.
This economy behaves in line with the model developed by Barsky, House, and Kimball
(2007), where the relative price only a¤ects the marginal rate of substitution between
di¤erent consumption goods.20
3 The Pareto Optimum
Removing sources of distortion in the labor market (imperfect labor mobility) and the
goods market (monopolistic competition) represents a desirable situation for a benevolent
central banker. At this stage of the analysis we are interested in understanding whether,
after removing these distortions (in a variant economy without cost-push shocks), the
monetary authority can attain a rst best allocation where ination and the output gap
in both sectors are jointly stabilized. The answer to this question is negative for general
17See DiPace (2008) for a sensitivity analysis to di¤erent instrumental rules. Bouakez, Cardia, and
Ruge-Murcia (2008) and Sudo (2008) produce analogous evidence through shocks to money supply.
18An alternative line of enquiry is followed by Monacelli (2009), who stresses the role of nancial market
imperfections in generating co-movement. DiCecio (2009), instead, argues that rigidity in nominal wages
is the key friction underlying sectoral co-movement.
19We would obtain analogous conclusions if we were to assume that each sector employs only input
materials that are produced within the same sector, i.e. by setting the o¤-diagonal elements of the
input-output matrix ( ) to zero. In this respect, the presence of cross-industry ows of input materials
are crucial for generating co-movement.
20When input-output interactions are switched o¤, imperfect labor mobility is not enough to generate
co-movement in the face of a monetary policy innovation (Bouakez et al., 2008).
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parameter values and shock processes. The following proposition formalizes our results.
Proposition 1 In the model with sticky prices and perfect labor mobility across sectors,
there exists no monetary policy that can attain the Pareto optimal allocation unless the
shock bu¤eting the non-durable goods sector equals the one bu¤eting the durable goods
sector, scaled by a factor  = (1  n) = (1  d).21
Proof. Suppose there were a monetary policy under which the equilibrium allocation
under sticky prices would be Pareto optimal. Then, in such an equilibrium, the gaps
would be completely closed for every period. That is, grmcnt = grmcdt = 0, 8t. It follows
from the pricing conditions that nt = 
d
t = 0, 8t. Recall that the relative price evolves
as: eqt = eqt 1 + nt   dt  qt :
Since we also have that eqt = 0, the equation above implies that nt   dt = qt . It can
be shown that:22
qt =
(1  d) znt   (1  n) zdt
1 + {
;
where
{ = nd(nn + dd   1)  nnn   ddd:
Therefore, it cannot be that nt = 
d
t = 0, unless q

t = 0, which translates into:
zdt
znt
=
1  d
1  n .
It is useful to interpret this result in connection with some previous contributions in
the literature on multi-sector models. Erceg and Levin (2006) suggest that in their two-
sector economy the monetary authority is faced with a trade-o¤ when trying to stabilize
output in both sectors in the face of asymmetric technology shocks. In a similar vein,
Huang and Liu (2005) emphasize that vertical trade linkages cause both aggregate output
and the relative price to uctuate in response to productivity shocks, unless these are
identical, in which case only output would uctuate. Therefore, the monetary authority
is faced with a trade-o¤, as it can stabilize either the output gap or the relative price
gap, but not both. In either case the impossibility to attain the Pareto optimum can be
traced back to the presence of sector-specic (asymmetric) technology shocks that give
rise to changes in the relative price. Since in the sticky-price equilibrium uctuations in
the relative price have an allocative role, the Pareto optimal allocation is not attainable.
Were the technology shocks perfectly correlated (i.e., common) across sectors, no trade-o¤
would arise.
When input materials are employed in both sectors, as in our setting, more restric-
tive conditions are required for the full stabilization of the model economy. In this case,
not only sectoral shocks need to be perfectly correlated, but the production technologies
need to be the same across sectors. Therefore, even in the presence of a common technol-
ogy shock, di¤erent production technologies would prevent the attainment of the Pareto
optimum.
21Allowing for imperfect labor mobility would only further constrain the ability of the monetary au-
thority to neutralize technology shocks.
22See Appendix E for the derivation of the relative price in the e¢ cient equilibrium with perfect labor
mobility.
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4 Optimal Monetary Policy
As shown in the previous section, the central bank cannot attain the Pareto optimal
allocation even after di¤erent sources of distortion in the labor and the goods market
are removed. Therefore, we turn our attention to policy strategies capable of attaining
second best outcomes. We explore equilibrium dynamics under the assumption that
the policy maker can credibly commit to a rule derived from the minimization of his
objective function. The optimal policy consists of maximizing the conditional expectation
of intertemporal household utility subject to private sectors behavioral equations and
resource constraints, as discussed by Woodford (2003).23
To evaluate social welfare we take a second-order Taylor approximation to the rep-
resentative households lifetime utility.24 Our procedure follows the standard analysis of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), adapted to account for the presence of factor demand
linkages. The resulting intertemporal social loss function reads as:
SW0   UH (H)H
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

   1


necnt + d edt2
+ &
h
$ (nt )
2 + (1 $)  dt 2i+ (1 + ) !ecnt + (1  !)ecdt 2
+ S
edt   edt 12+ t.i.p.+O  kk3 ; (20)
where:
S = d
 1 + (1  ) (1  !)  2;
 =
n [1   (1  )] + d
1   (1  ) ;
$ = "n (n&)
 1 ;
! =
n [1   (1  )]
n [1   (1  )] + d
;
& = "n (n)
 1 + (1  ) "d (d) 1 ;
i =
(1  i) (1  i)
i
; i = fn; dg
and t.i.p. collects the terms independent of policy stabilization, whereas O
 kk3 sum-
marizes all terms of third order or higher.
According to (20) the welfare criterion assumed by the central bank balances, along
with sectoral ination variability, uctuations in aggregate consumption (or, equivalently,
value added). This is a distinctive feature of the model under scrutiny, as the presence
23We pursue a timeless perspective approach, as in Woodford (1999). This involves ignoring the
conditions that prevail at the regimes inception, thus imagining that the commitment to apply the rules
deriving from the optimization problem had been made in the distant past. In this case, there is no
dynamic inconsistency in terms of the central banks own decision-making process. The system is solved
for the evolution of the endogenous variables by relying on the common practice discussed, e.g., by Sims
(2002).
24We assume that the shocks that hit the economy are not big enough to lead to paths of the endogenous
variables distant from their steady state levels. This means that shocks do not drive the economy too far
from its approximation point and, therefore, a linear quadratic approximation to the policy problem leads
to reasonably accurate solutions. Appendix F reports the derivation of the quadratic welfare function.
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of input materials implies a non-trivial distinction between output and consumption.
Therefore, it is no longer irrelevant whether the central bank targets output or consump-
tion gap variability. In the remainder of the paper we show that the distinction between
output and consumption has important implications for the transmission of exogenous
shocks under the optimal policy and the selection of an alternative policy regime that
can generate a welfare loss close to that attained under the optimal policy.
Approximating the terms of social welfare associated with the durables sector also
delivers a term reecting a preference to smooth the accumulation of the stock of durable
goods.25 Assuming durables accumulation smoothing as a stabilization objective helps
at counteracting the amplication e¤ect of changes in the stock demand of durables on
the ow demand of newly produced durable goods. The remaining weights of the time-
varying terms in (20) can be interpreted as follows: (i) & indexes the total degree of
nominal stickiness in the economy and is inversely related to both d and n; (ii) $
accounts for the relative degree of price stickiness in the non-durable goods sector; (iii) !
is the relative weight of non-durable consumption over total consumption when durable
goods are reported as a ow. This is an inverse function of . In turn,  depends
on the degree of durability of goods produced in sector d. For  = 0 it reduces to n,
whereas for  = 1 it reduces to one. Therefore, as the degree of durability increases,
the weight attached to the non-durable consumption gap increases with respect to that
attached to the durable term. Notice also that the relative importance of sector-specic
ination variability depends on the steady state ratio of labor supplied to the non-durable
goods sector to the total labor force ().26 When input materials are not employed in
the production process (i.e., n = d = 0) the loss function reduces to that obtained in
traditional two-sector models where consumption and gross output are equalized (e.g.,
Erceg and Levin, 2006). Furthermore, for  = 0 we end up in the case considered by
Woodford (2003, pp. 435-443).
How do factor demand linkages inuence social welfare? The left-hand panel of Figure
2 reports the loss dened over the subspace of the production parameters n and d.
The right-hand panel of the gure reports analogous evidence under the assumption that
technology shocks are the only source of exogenous perturbation. The general pattern
suggests that welfare loss increases monotonically in the share of intermediate goods used
to produce non-durable goods, whereas the share of input materials in the durable goods
sector exerts a negligible impact. This di¤erential impact can be ascribed to the non-
durable goods sector being the largest sector and a net supplier of input materials in the
model economy.
We are not only concerned, however, with the direct welfare implications of factor
demand linkages, but also with central bankspotential misperception about their role
in the production process. Neglecting cross-industry ows of input materials is likely
to generate excess loss with respect to the welfare criterion consistent with correctly
specied model economy. To address this issue we implement the optimal policy under
the assumption that n = d = 0 . Table 1 reports the (percentage) excess loss under
misperception with respect to the loss under the correctly specied production structure
of the economy. As the actual intensity of use of input materials increases, excess loss
can be substantial. Notice also that the marginal impact of misperceiving n is greater
25Details on the linear approximation of this term are available in the technical appendix. However,
as discussed by Erceg and Levin (2006) this term makes a relatively minor contribution to the overall
loss.
26When n = d it follows that  = L
n
L =
Y n
Y n+Y d
.
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than that associated with d. Once again, considering that the non-durables sector is a
net supplier of input materials and the largest sector in our calibrated model economy is
the key for interpretation of this result.
4.1 Impulse-response Analysis under Optimal Monetary Policy
Figure 3 reports equilibrium dynamics of the model economy following a one-standard-
deviation technology shock in the non-durable goods sector.27 The graphs in the left-hand
panel refer to the model with factor demand linkages, whereas on the right-hand side we
consider the model with no input materials. Ination and interest rates are annualized.
Symmetric nominal rigidity is assumed, with n = d = 0:75.28
A technology shock in the non-durable goods sector causes production of these goods
to become relatively cheaper, thus increasing their production and consumption. How-
ever, their price is prevented from reaching the level consistent with exible prices. This
determines a negative non-durables consumption gap. As to the response of the central
bank, the real interest rate (measured in units of non-durable goods) initially rises in the
model with no input materials, thus preventing output (and consumption) in the non-
durables sector from rising as much as it would do under exible prices. Concurrently,
the real rate of interest does not rise enough to prevent the output gap in the durables
sector from rising too much. As discussed by Erceg and Levin (2006), keeping output
at potential in the non-durable goods sector requires a "sharp and persistent fall" in the
real interest rate. By contrast, a sharp rise in the policy instrument is required to keep
output at potential in the durable goods sector. This is exactly what happens in the
variant economy with no input materials. Conversely, in the model with factor demand
linkages the real interest rate initially decreases, gradually converging to its equilibrium
level thereafter. Keeping output at potential in the non-durable goods sector prevails
over the alternative objective. This result is intimately related to the existence of factor
demand linkages, which amplify the response of non-durables consumption under exible
prices, thus inducing a stronger drop in the consumption gap of the same sector. More-
over, cross-industry ows of input materials induce durable consumption under exible
prices to increase, thus helping to reduce the durables consumption gap. This endoge-
nous mechanism is not at work in the model without factor demand linkages, in which
case durables consumption under exible prices is not a¤ected by the shock as a result
of setting  = 1, which implies separability of householdspreferences in durable and
non-durable consumption.
It is worth recalling that, in the presence of input-output interactions between sectors,
the relative price does not only exert a direct e¤ect on the marginal rate of substitution
between durable and non-durable consumption goods. As shown by equations (10) and
(11), Qt also exerts a positive (negative) e¤ect on the real marginal cost in the durable
(non-durable) goods sector. A technology shock in the non-durables sector determines a
positive relative price gap, which implies a substitution away from non-durable to durable
27The responses to a technology shock in the durable goods sector mirror those induced by a produc-
tivity shock in the non-durable goods sector in the opposite direction. For this reason, and for brevity of
exposition, we skip their description. However, these results, as well as those in the case of a cost-push
shock in the durables sector, are available upon request from the authors.
28As in Strum (2009) we opt for this choice to prevent the central bank from focusing exclusively on
the stickier sector in the formulation of its optimal policy, as predicted by Aoki (2001). In the next
subsections we draw implications from the model under asymmetric degrees of nominal rigidity across
sectors.
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consumption goods. Concurrently, the intermediate input channel is responsible for in-
ducing higher inationary pressures in the non-durables sector and a lower deationary
e¤ect in the durables sector, compared to what is otherwise observed in the right-hand
panel of Figure 3. The contraction in non-durables gross output is partially o¤set by the
increase in the demand of non-durable intermediate goods from rms in the durables sec-
tor, which eventually results in lower deationary pressures on the price of non-durables.
Similarly, stronger inationary pressures in the durable sector are induced by a produc-
tion gap which is higher than that obtained by setting n = d = 0. Moreover, the
positive relative price gap reinforces this e¤ect on durables ination through its inuence
on the real marginal cost. These e¤ects, combined with the expansionary policy pursued
by the central bank, determine rising inationary pressures at the aggregate level.
Figure 4 reports equilibrium dynamics following a cost-push shock in the non-durables
sector. A distinctive feature of the model with cross-industry ows of input materials is
that the e¤ect of the positive relative price gap on the marginal cost of rms producing
durables partially counteracts the deationary e¤ect that operates through the conven-
tional demand channel. Concurrently, the overall contractionary e¤ect in consumption
and production is magnied by the presence of factor demand linkages. This leads the
central bank to pursue a weakly contractionary policy, initially accompanied by a negative
real rate of interest. This policy reaction is also justied by the fact that changes in the
relative price are channeled through the sectoral marginal costs and act as an endogenous
attenuator of deationary pressures in the sector which is not hit by the shock.
It is worth drawing attention to a subtle di¤erence in the transmission of technology
and cost-push shocks within this class of models. Sectoral technology shocks cause the
consumption gaps in each sector to co-move negatively. The drop in the consumption gap
of the sector that experiences the positive technology shock is compensated by a rise in the
demand gap of intermediate goods from the other sector. Thus, each sector experiences
opposite demand e¤ects on the markets for the consumption and intermediate goods. By
contrast, a sectoral cost-push shock determines a contraction of nal goods consumption
in both sectors. In turn, the contraction in the demand of both consumption goods
causes a drop in the consumption of intermediate goods by both sectors, thus resulting
in an even grater slump in the gross output.29 The stark di¤erence in the response of the
output and consumption gaps to sectoral cost-push shocks has non-negligible implications
for the implementation of the optimal policy and the choice of alternative policy regimes
in the presence of a trade-o¤ between ination and output/consumption stabilization, as
we show in Section 4.2.
4.2 Optimal Monetary Policy versus Alternative Policy Regimes
We now assess the loss of welfare under the optimal policy and various alternative policies.
Alternative policy regimes admit simple loss functions, which are selected because of their
suitability to be communicated to and understood by the public. We use the second-
order welfare approximation (20) as a model-consistent metric. In each case we compute
the expected welfare loss as the percentage of steady state aggregate consumption (and
29Importantly, imperfect labor mobility exacerbates this e¤ect, increasing the wedge between consump-
tion and production. When aggregate demand increases, as labor cannot ow across sectors without
frictions, rms need to increase intermediate inputs by more than they would under the assumption
of perfect labor mobility to meet the increased demand. Consequently, uctuations in production and
consumption are wider in the presence of imperfect labor mobility.
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multiply the resulting term by 100).
We consider both strict and exible ination targeting regimes,30 as well as consump-
tion and output gap targeting. Ination targeting regimes may target either core or
aggregate ination. In the rst case the weights attached to the sectoral rates of in-
ation depend on the relative degree of price rigidity, as well as on the relative size of
each sector and the degree of substitutability among di¤erentiated goods. In the second
case the weights attached to sectoral inations only depend on the relative size of each
sector. Flexible ination targeting regimes balance uctuations in core or aggregate ina-
tion together with a term that penalizes uctuations in aggregate consumption or gross
output.
Both strict or exible ination targeting regimes aim at stabilizing the volatility of
aggregate (or core) ination and not the volatility of sectoral inations separately. From
a strategic viewpoint we are willing to understand whether the central bank can ap-
proximate the optimal policy outcome without taking the sectoral rates of ination as
separate objectives. In principle, this should enable the monetary authority to provide
the public with a more intelligible target. Svensson (1997) stresses the importance of
assuming intermediate targets which are highly correlated with the goal, easy to control,
and transparent, so as to enhance communication to the public. In this sense, measures
of overall ination are more suitable than sectoral rates of ination.
Table 2 reports the welfare loss under the optimal rule and various alternative pol-
icy regimes. The overall loss is disaggregated into the variability of each of the terms
weighted in (20). To compare equilibrium paths under alternative regimes, we evalu-
ate the associated loss by taking our second-order approximation to householdsutility
function as a benchmark. In the rst instance both technology and cost-push shocks are
assumed to bu¤et the model economy. Moreover, we assume that sectors are symmetric
in the degree of nominal rigidity (n = d = 0:75): in this case coret = 
agg
t . Later in
this section we will relax this assumption. As expected on a priori grounds, whenever
cost-push shocks are accounted for, a exible ination targeting regime performs nearly
as well as the optimal policy.31 Most importantly, the central bank attains a welfare loss
closer to that under the optimal policy when uctuations in aggregate (or core) ina-
tion are balanced with those in the real value added (i.e., consumption), compared to
the loss induced by controlling uctuations in the gross output (i.e., production). Recall
also from Section 4.1 that sectoral cost-push shocks typically induce higher variability
in production than consumption, the reason being that a contraction (expansion) in the
consumption of both sectors determines a contraction (expansion) in the demand of input
materials and thus a higher drop (rise) in sectoral gross outputs. Therefore, assuming a
welfare criterion that balances uctuations in the rate of ination with gross output vari-
ability misrepresents the actual trade-o¤ faced by the central bank. Indeed, according
to (20) ination variability should be balanced with uctuations in consumption rather
than gross output.
Table 3 reports the relative performance of alternative policy regimes under di¤erent
sources of exogenous perturbation. We consider both our benchmark model economy
(n = d = 0:6), and the model with no input materials (n = d = 0). As observed
at di¤erent stages of the analysis, deadweight loss is generally higher in the rst case.
30The analytic specication of each regime is reported in Appendix G.
31Compared to the optimal policy, under this regime the central bank is more e¤ective in stabilizing the
sectoral rates of ination, thus compensating, at least partially, the higher loss induced by the volatility
in aggregate consumption and durables accumulation.
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Once again, exible ination targeting outperforms other regimes. This is also the case
when shocks to either sector are considered separately (see Table 3, columns 3 and 4).
As noted by Woodford (2003, pp. 435-443), strict ination targeting displays a "compet-
itive" performance only when technology shocks are the unique source of perturbation to
the system, whereas accounting for cost-push shocks entails a rather poor performance.
However, in this case the loss attained under strict ination targeting is much larger in
the model with factor demand linkages, compared to that registered in the alternative
scenario without input materials (see also Table 2, where both types of sectoral shocks
are considered). In addition, it is worth pointing out that output gap targeting outper-
forms consumption gap targeting under either source of exogenous perturbation. In this
case, reducing consumption gap volatility allows the central bank to control only part
of the volatility in the marginal cost, whereas targeting the production gap would also
account for the presence of factor demand linkages. In turn, sectoral ination volatility
also benets from this e¤ect (see Table 2, columns 3 and 4).
Table 4 reports the loss of welfare under asymmetric price stickiness, in the form of
durables prices being more exible than non-durables prices (n = 0:75, d = 0:25).32 In
this case core ination di¤ers from aggregate ination, as discussed earlier. Considering
core ination targeting as an alternative to aggregate ination targeting is somewhat
related to a long-standing debate on the information (in terms of relative sectoral price
stickiness) that the central bank can access when formulating its policy. Woodford (2003)
shows that, in a two-sector model with no input materials, optimal commitment policy
is nearly replicated by an ination targeting regime, whereby the weights attached to
sectoral inations depend on the relative degree of nominal stickiness.33 This result is
robust across the two versions of the model economy and, as expected, it can only be
replicated if we rule out sectoral cost-push shocks. However, when assessing exible
targeting regimes in the model with asymmetric price stickiness the dichotomy between
aggregate and core ination loses much of the usual appeal in terms of comparing welfare
losses. Once again, what seems relevant and inherently connected with the presence of
input materials is the distinction between output and consumption. In fact, a exible
ination targeting regime balancing consumption and (either core or aggregate) ination
variability delivers a loss of welfare substantially lower than that attained under a loss
function balancing output and (either core or aggregate) ination variability.
4.3 Sectoral Asymmetries
We now examine the implications of allowing for asymmetric degrees of competitiveness
and price stickiness between sectors for the optimal weighting of sectoral inations and
the resulting welfare properties of the model economy. Our exercise is performed by
varying the sectoral Calvo parameters and the elasticities of substitution between goods
produced within the same sector, under the assumption that their aggregate counterparts
32Bils and Klenow (2004) report a higher frequency of price adjustment for consumer durables than
services. Erceg and Levin (2006) assume that non-durables and durables are equally sticky. By contrast,
Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) develop models where durables
prices are exible and non-durables prices are sticky.
33Aoki (2001) shows that the welfare-theoretic loss function consistent with a multi-sector economy
with heterogeneous degrees of price stickiness assigns higher weight on the ination variability of sectors
characterized by higher nominal stickiness. This provides a theoretical basis for seeking to stabilize an
appropriately dened measure of "core" ination rather than an equally weighted price index.
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are xed at the value consistent with the symmetric case.34
As the monetary policy authority operates in a timeless perspective, the resulting rule
is optimal regardless of the nature of the (additive) exogenous disturbances that bu¤et
the model economy, as discussed by Giannoni and Woodford (2003). Thus, it is possible
to analyze the e¤ect of sector-specic technology and cost-push shocks separately. Figure
5 summarizes the key results: the y-axis (x-axis) in each graph measures the stickiness
gap (competitive gap), as in Lombardo (2006).35
On average, input-output interactions increase deadweight loss for di¤erent degrees of
asymmetry in either dimension. This result holds both when only technology shocks are
accounted for, as well as in the model with only cost-push shocks: in this case the loss is
15% to 55% higher than that attainable without input materials. Otherwise, when only
technology shocks are considered, the loss of social welfare is 25% to 50% higher than
that without input materials.
Model with Technology Shocks - We rst consider technology shocks as the sole
source of exogenous perturbation. Before exploring asymmetry under our baseline cal-
ibration, it is instructive to provide a gradual overview of the e¤ects brought by each
distinctive feature of the model.36 We start by assuming a two-sector economy with sec-
tors of equal size, no durability in either of the consumption goods, and no input materials
(i.e., n = d = 0,  = 1 and n = d = ! = ). The resulting loss function is concave
over both dimensions of asymmetry. A hump-shaped pattern emerges over the subspace
considered. As asymmetry increases in either dimension, overall unconditional variance
decreases. This result is in line with Woodford (2003), Benigno (2004) and Lombardo
(2006), and is closely related to the existence of a trade-o¤ in the stabilization of sec-
toral rates of ination.37 When sectors have the same size and production characteristics,
asymmetry in the degree of nominal stickiness (and/or in the competition gap) mitigates
the trade-o¤, as the monetary authority can predominantly focus on controlling ina-
tion variability in the stickier sector. The resulting deadweight loss decreases due to the
combined e¤ect of: (i) higher policy e¤ectiveness against uctuations in the sector with
higher price rigidity and/or higher elasticity of substitution in demand, and (ii) lower
price rigidity and/or lower elasticity of substitution in the demand of goods produced by
the other sector. These e¤ects imply lower ination persistence and lower cross-sectional
dispersion in prices, respectively. When input materials are introduced and sectors are
of equal size (n = d = 0:6,  = 1 and n = d) the loss is still symmetric over the
"nominal rigidity gap", but decreases in the gap between "n and "d. Due to the pres-
ence of factor demand linkages, ine¢ ciencies from nominal rigidities in either sector are
partially passed onto the other sector. This e¤ect helps at counteracting the inuence
34We set  = 0:75 and " = 11, as in the baseline calibration with symmetric sectoral nominal stickiness
and elasticities of substitution in demand. Thus, we map the loss under an optimal monetary policy for
di¤erent values of the "nominal rigidity gap" (n   d) and the "competition gap"
 
"n   "d, under the
assumption that n + (1  ) d =  and "n + (1  ) "d = ".
35Benigno (2004) explores the impact of asymmetry in the degree of nominal stickiness on the loss
of social welfare in the context of a monetary union. Lombardo (2006) shows how asymmetries in the
degree of competition can exacerbate or mitigate the e¤ects of asymmetric price rigidity.
36Due to space limitations, we only describe the deadweight loss under di¤erent parameterizations,
rather than reporting the corresponding graphs. These are available, upon request, from the authors.
37Lombardo (2006) shows that when prices are set in a staggered fashion, the amount of output
dispersiongenerated by a given deviation of prices from their average depends positively on the elasticity
of substitution between goods (i.e., the degree of competition in our model). Therefore, the country with
the largest degree of competition is the one that generates the greatest cost of ination.
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of the nominal rigidity gap on social welfare. Moreover, if the competition gap is posi-
tive ("n > "d), then the weight attached to non-durable goods ination rises linearly in
"n. In this sense, the monetary authority has to pay more attention to ination uctu-
ations in this sector (with respect to the symmetric case). In turn, provided that the
non-durable goods sector is a net supplier of intermediate goods in the model economy,
stabilizing nt helps to reduce uctuations in the marginal cost gap of the durable goods
sector, which is also a¤ected by the relative price gap. When durability is accounted for
(n = d = 0:6,  = 0:025 and n = d), an additional objective emerges in the central
banks welfare criterion, which reects a preference for smoothing the accumulation of
the stock of durables. This term amplies the impact of nominal rigidities in the durable
goods sector, thus causing the total deadweight loss to increase for d > n and "d > "n.
Under our baseline calibration (n = d = 0:6,  = 0:025 and n = 0:682) asymmetry
in the degree of nominal stickiness exerts a stronger marginal impact on welfare. For a
given level of asymmetry in sectoral competition, optimal monetary policy places greater
weight on the "stickier" sector. The minimum loss is attained when the economy is char-
acterized by both the highest asymmetry in the degree of competitiveness and nominal
stickiness, and specically when the non-durable goods sector is more competitive and
stickier. Note that, given the relative size of the two sectors, to keep aggregate stickiness
at a xed level, a marginal increase in n has to be coupled with a more than proportional
decrease in d. Analogous observations apply to the competition gap. Higher n and "n
mean that the central bank penalizes inationary pressures relatively more in the broader
sector of the model economy.
Model with Cost-Push Shocks - In the remainder we rely on the baseline calibra-
tion reported in Section 2, while still considering the e¤ects of varying the competition
and the rigidity gap. The introduction of sectoral cost-push shocks generates a trade-o¤
between output and ination stabilization. Total welfare decreases in the degree of asym-
metry in nominal stickiness and competition between sectors. This can be explained
intuitively. As implied by (20), the Calvo parameters indexing the degree of nominal
rigidity in either sector enter non-linearly in the term of loss associated with uctua-
tions in core ination. By contrast, the elasticity of substitution between goods produced
in either sector only a¤ects the relative weight of core ination, &. The trade-o¤ be-
tween ination and consumption stabilization is such that ination volatility induced by
sector-specic cost-push shocks is not completely stabilized by the monetary authority.
Consequently, the contour map tracks the pattern of & in the subspace dened over the
asymmetry gaps. In particular, & evolves convexically with respect to the nominal rigidity
gap and increases (decreases) for n greater (lower) than d.
Model with Technology and Cost-Push Shocks - As expected on a priori
grounds, the analysis of the loss function in the presence of both sources of exogenous
perturbation suggests that the monetary authority faces an easier task in the stabilization
of the variability induced by the technology shocks, compared to its performance in the
presence of cost-push shocks. As cost-push shocks produce a non-trivial trade-o¤between
ination and output stabilization, they have a predominant impact on welfare. This is
clearly displayed in the last panel of Figure 5, where the aggregate loss is convex with
respect to the nominal rigidity gap, while the e¤ect of the competition gap is negative
(positive) when the nominal rigidity gap is positive (negative).
19
5 Conclusions
We have integrated a horizontal input-output production structure into a dynamic general
equilibrium model with two sectors that produce durable and non-durable goods. Part
of the output produced in each sector is used as an intermediate input of production in
both sectors, according to a realistic input-output structure of the economy. The resulting
sectoral interactions have non-negligible implications for the formulation of policies aimed
at reducing real and nominal uctuations. A key role is played by the relative price of
non-durable goods, which not only acts as an allocative mechanism on the demand side,
through its inuence on the user cost of durable goods, but also on the supply side,
through its e¤ect on the sectoral real marginal costs of production.
The presence of input materials implies a non-trivial di¤erence between consumption
(or, equivalently, value added) and gross output. Such a distinction proves to be of cru-
cial importance at di¤erent stages of the analysis. In fact, the welfare criterion consistent
with a second-order approximation to householdsutility reveals that the policy maker
is faced with the task of stabilizing uctuations in sectoral ination and aggregate value
added, rather than gross output. Moreover, strategic complementarities induced by factor
demand linkages amplify the loss of social welfare under the optimal policy and alter the
transmission of shocks to the system, compared to what is commonly observed in other-
wise standard two-sector models. For example, in the face of a sector-specic cost push
shock the intermediate input channel acts as an endogenous stabilizer that attenuates
the deationary e¤ect in the sector which is not hit by the shock.
These results show how accounting for a realistic feature of multi-sector economies,
such as factor demand linkages, entails non-negligible di¤erences with respect to policy
prescriptions referring to frameworks that rule out cross-industry input-output interac-
tions. The optimal policy can be closely approximated by a exible ination targeting
regime. However, it is of crucial importance to target consumption gap variability rather
than output gap variability. This strategy allows the central bank to avoid inducing
additional loss emanating from inter-sectoral complementarities.
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TABLES
TABLE 1: FACTOR DEMAND LINKAGES MISPERCEPTION
TECH SHOCKS
n=d 0 0:3 0:6 0:8
0 0 4.664 22.468 52.119
0:3 2.348 1.012 14.763 41.453
0:6 17.232 0.906 5.713 27.242
0:8 49.424 8.468 1.160 17.336
COST PUSH SHOCKS
n=d 0 0:3 0:6 0:8
0 0 2.984 9.400 16.554
0:3 3.904 1.234 4.970 10.061
0:6 28.415 11.303 10.324 13.976
0:8 92.084 45.841 36.050 38.283
BOTH SHOCKS
n=d 0 0:3 0:6 0:8
0 0 3.075 10.210 18.322
0:3 3.552 1.209 5.601 11.267
0:6 25.684 8.912 9.517 14.037
0:8 77.991 30.982 27.664 35.721
Note: We report the percentage excess loss under a misperception of the input-output structure with
respect to the loss under the correctly specied production structure of the economy, for di¤erent shocks.
TABLE 2: WELFARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
Loss Components
edt nt dt xt Total
Optimal Policy 0.0417 0.6477 0.2918 0.2274 1.2086
Ination Targeting 0.5486 0.0785 0.3472 2.6662 3.6405
Consumption Gap Targeting 0.0234 1.6396 0.4026 0.0000 2.0656
Production Gap Targeting 0.0133 1.5380 0.3721 0.0067 1.9300
Flexible Ination Targeting (with Consumption) 0.0476 0.6360 0.2900 0.2377 1.2113
Flexible Ination Targeting (with Output) 0.0121 1.1501 0.3234 0.0243 1.5099
Note: edt refers to the durable smoothing objective, and xt= !ecnt+(1  !)ecdt . The welfare loss is
computed as a percentage of steady state aggregate consumption (multiplied by 100).
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TABLE 3: WELFARE UNDER ALTERNATIVE POLIC IES AND DIFFERENT PRODUCTION STRUCTURES
MODEL W ITH FACTOR DEMAND LINKAGES (n = d = 0:6)
Tech. Sho cks Cost Push Shocks Dur. Sec. Sho cks Non-Dur. Sec. Sho cks
Optimal Policy 0.1741 1.0645 0.2686 0.9658
Ination Targeting 0.1768 3.5025 0.3891 3.3110
Consumption Gap Targeting 0.2016 1.9235 0.2881 1.8400
Production Gap Targeting 0.1758 1.7903 0.2957 1.6749
F lex . Ination Targeting (w ith Cons.) 0 .1753 1.0654 0.2702 0.9665
F lex . Ination Targeting (w ith Prod .) 0 .1744 1.3664 0.2823 1.2581
MODEL W ITHOUT FACTOR DEMAND LINKAGES (n = d = 0)
Tech. Sho cks Cost Push Shocks Dur. Sec. Sho cks Non-Dur. Sec. Sho cks
Optimal Policy 0.1156 0.6897 0.2854 0.5152
Ination Targeting 0.1166 0.8662 0.3028 0.6778
Output Gap Targeting 0.1217 1.6498 0.4196 1.3670
F lex . Ination Targeting 0.1163 0.6907 0.2856 0.5168
Note: The rst two columns report the loss attributable to technology shocks and cost-push shocks
generated in both sectors, respectively. The last two columns report the loss due to both shocks in either
sector. The welfare loss is computed as a percentage of steady state aggregate consumption (multiplied
by 100).
TABLE 4: ASYMMETRIC STICKINESS
Tech. Shocks Cost Push Shocks Both Shocks
Optimal Policy 0.0388 0.8648 0.9009
Core Ination Targeting 0.0391 3.6864 3.7190
Agg. Ination Targeting 0.2000 1.3171 1.4857
Consumption Gap Targeting 0.0408 1.6711 1.7106
Production Gap Targeting 0.0396 1.6575 1.6955
Flex. Core Ination Targeting (with Cons.) 0.0402 0.8654 0.9036
Flex. Agg. Ination Targeting (with Cons.) 0.0936 0.8757 0.9561
Flex. Core Ination Targeting (with Prod.) 0.0396 1.1855 1.2235
Flex. Agg. Ination Targeting (with Prod.) 0.0463 1.1517 1.1972
Note: We set the average duration of the non-durable goodsprices at 4 quarters, whereas we reduce
the duration of durable goods prices to 1.3 quarters (d = 0:25). The welfare loss is computed as a
percentage of steady state aggregate consumption (multiplied by 100).
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FIGURE 1: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A MONETARY POLICY TIGHTENING
MODEL W ITH FACTOR DEMAND LINKAGES MODEL W ITHOUT FACTOR DEMAND LINKAGES
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Note: We employ the following instrumental rule brt = rbrt 1 + (1  r)t + urt , where urt is
an iid (0; 1) monetary policy innovation and the constant term involving the ination target has been
suppressed for simplicity. The interest rate smoothing parameter r is set to 0:7, while  = 1:5.
We assume that the monetary authority responds to a convex combination of the sector-specic rates of
ination.
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FIGURE 2: WELFARE UNDER OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY FOR VARYING n AND d
TECHNOLOGY AND COST-PUSH SHOCKS ONLY TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS
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Note: The left-hand panel of Figure 2 reports the welfare loss dened over the subspace of the
production parameters in the two sectors when both technology and cost-push shocks bu¤et the model
economy. The right-hand panel reports analogous evidence under the assumption that technology shocks
are the only source of exogenous perturbation. The values of each contour line refer to the loss as a
percentage of steady state aggregate consumption.
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FIGURE 3: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A TECHNOLOGY SHOCK IN THE NON-DURABLE GOODS SECTOR
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Note: The relative price gap is re-scaled by a factor of four to account for the marked e¤ect brought by
factor demand linkages in the amplication of the sectoral shocks.
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FIGURE 4: IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A COST-PUSH SHOCK IN THE NON-DURABLE GOODS SECTOR
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FIGURE 5: THE IMPACT OF ASYMMETRY ON WELFARE LOSS
TECHNOLOGY SHOCKS COST-PUSH SHOCKS TECHNOLOGY AND COST-PUSH SHOCKS
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Note: We set  = 0:75 and " = 11, as in the baseline calibration with symmetric sectoral nominal
stickiness and elasticities of substitution in demand. Thus, we map the loss under optimal monetary
policy for di¤erent values of the "nominal rigidity gap" (n   d) and the "competition gap"
 
"n   "d,
under the assumption that n + (1  ) d =  and "n + (1  ) "d = ". The values of each
contour line refer to the loss as a percentage of steady state aggregate consumption.
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APPENDIX A: First Order Conditions from House-
holdsUtility Maximization
Maximizing (12) subject to (13), (14), (15), and (16) leads to a set of rst-order conditions
that can be re-arranged to obtain:
nH
1 
t (C
n
t )
 1 = RtEt
"
nH
1 
t+1
 
Cnt+1
 1
nt+1
#
; (21a)
nH
1 
t P
d
t
Cnt P
n
t
= Et

 (1  )n
H1 t+1 P
d
t+1
Cnt+1P
n
t+1
+ (21b)
+
dH
1 
t
Dt

1  
D
(Dt  Dt 1)
 1 +  D dH1 t+1Dt+1 (Dt+1  Dt) 1
)
;
W nt
nH
1 
t (C
n
t )
 1
P nt
= % 
1
L
v  1

t (L
n
t )
1
 ; (21c)
W dt
nH
1 
t (C
n
t )
 1
P nt
= % (1  )  1 Lv 
1

t
 
Ldt
 1
 : (21d)
APPENDIX B: Some Useful Steady State Relation-
ships
As in the competitive equilibrium real wage in each sector equals the marginal product
of labor. Thus, we can derive the following relationship between the production in non-
durable and durable goods in the steady state:
Y n
Y d
=
(1  d)
(1  n) (1  )Q
 1:
Furthermore, the following relationship between durable and non-durable consumption
can be derived from the Euler conditions:
Cn
Cd
= (1   (1  )) n
d
1

Q 1.
Moreover, the following shares of consumption and intermediate goods over total produc-
tion are determined for the non-durable goods sector:
Cn
Y n
=
(1  nnn) (1  d)  (1  n) (1  )dnd
 (1  d) ;
Mnn
Y n
= nnn;
Mnd
Y n
=
(1  n)

1  
1  ddnd:
Analogously, for the durable goods sector:
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Cd
Y d
=
(1  ddd) (1  ) (1  n)  (1  d)ndn
(1  ) (1  n) ;
Mdn
Y d
=
1  d
1  

1  nndn;
Mdd
Y d
= ddd:
These conditions prove to be crucial in the second-order approximation of consumers
utility to eliminate linear terms. Moreover, they allow us to derive the steady state ratio
of labor supply in the non-durable goods sector over the total labor supply ().
The Relative Price in the Steady State
We consider the steady state condition for the marginal cost in the non-durable goods
sector:
MCn = n

(P n)nn
 
P d
dnn (W n)1 n ;
n = 
n
n (1  n)1 n :
As in the steady state production subsidies neutralize distortions due to imperfect com-
petition:
P n = MCn
= n

(P n)nn
 
P d
dnn (W n)1 n :
After some trivial manipulations it can be shown that:
nQ
 ndn (RW n)1 n = 1:
Analogously, for the durables goods sector:
dQ
dnd
 
RW d
1 d = 1:
Using the fact that in steady state W n = W d = W :
RW n
RW d
Q = 1;
( 1n Q
ndn)
1
1 n 
 1d Q dnd
 1
1 d
Q = 1:
Therefore:
Q =

1 dn 
 (1 n)
d
 1
'
;
' = (1  n) (1  d) + ndn (1  d) + dnd (1  n) :
Notice that, when n = d = 1:
Q = n
 1
d
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as in the case considered by Huang and Liu (2005) and Strum (2008).
APPENDIX C: Equilibrium Dynamics in the E¢ cient
Equilibrium
In this appendix we outline the solution method of the linear model under the e¢ cient
equilibrium. This is obtained when both prices are exible and elasticities of substitution
are constant. Let us start from the pricing rule under exible prices:
P n

t =
n
1 + n
MCn

t
=
n
1 + n

n  
P n

t
nn  P dt dnn  W t 1 n
Znt
P d

t =
d
1 +  d
MCd

t
=
d
1 +  d

d  
P n

t
nd  P dt ddd  W t 1 d
Zdt
where n and d denote the mark-up terms. In log-linear form the conditions above
reduce to:
(1  n) rwnt = znt + ndnqt (22)
(1  d) rwdt = zdt   dndqt (23)
We now recall some conditions under exible prices from the linearized system:
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cdt =
1

dt  
1  

dt 1; (24)
rwnt =  cnt   (1  )ddt +

v (1  )  1


ldt
+

#+
1


lnt ; (25)
lnt = 
 
rwnt   rwdt + qt

+ ldt ; (26)
ynt =
Cn
Y n
cnt +
Mnn
Y n
mnnt +
Mnd
Y n
mndt ; (27)
ydt =
Cd
Y d
xt +
Mdn
Y d
mdnt +
Mdd
Y d
mddt ; (28)
0 = rwnt + l
n
t   ynt ; (29)
0 = rwdt + l
d
t   ydt ; (30)
0 = mnnt   ynt ; (31)
0 = mndt + q

t   ydt ; (32)
0 = mdnt   qt   ynt ; (33)
0 = mddt   ydt ; (34)
where # =
 
v   1


,  = (1  )n   1 and  = LnL . We substitute (22) and (23) into
(28) and (29) respectively:
lnt = y
n
t  
1
1  n z
n
t  
ndn
1  n q

t ; (35)
ldt = y
d
t  
1
1  d z
d
t +
dnd
1  d q

t : (36)
We can use conditions (26), (27), and (31)-(34), to obtain:
ynt =
Cn
Y n
cnt +
Mnn
Y n
ynt +
Mnd
Y n
 
ydt   qt

and
ydt =
Cd
Y d
cdt +
Mdn
Y d
(qt + c
g
t ) +
Mdd
Y d
ydt :
We can nd a VAR solution to this system, so that we can express ynt and y
d
t as a
function of cnt , c
d
t and q

t :
A

ynt
ydt

= B

cnt
cdt

+qt ;
34
where
A =
"
1  Mnn
Y n
 Mnd
Y n
 Mdn
Y d
1  Mdd
Y d
#
=
"
Cn
Y n
+ M
nd
Y n
 Mnd
Y n
 Mdn
Y d
Cd
Y d
+ M
dn
Y d
#
;
B =

Cn
Y n
0
0 C
d
Y d

;
 =
"
 Mnd
Y n
Mdn
Y d
#
:
Thus, we obtain: 
ynt
ydt

= A 1B

cnt
cdt

+A 1qt ;
or equivalently:
ynt =  1c
n
t +  2c
d
t +  5q

t ;
ydt =  3c
n
t +  4c
d
t +  6q

t :
Clearly, interdependence among sectors reects the presence of cross-industry ows of
input materials that imply  2;  3;  5;  6 6= 0 and  1;  4 6= 1. Plugging these expressions
into (35) and (36) we obtain:
lnt =  1c
n
t +  2c
d
t  
1
1  n z
n
t +

 5  
ndn
1  n

qt (37)
ldt =  3c
n
t +  4c
d
t  
1
1  d z
d
t +

dnd
1  d +  6

qt (38)
Thus, we can substitute everything into (25) and (22):
1 + v
1  n z
n
t + 1z
d
t = 2c
n
t   (1  )ddt + 3cdt + 4qt ; (39)
where:
1 =
v(1  )  1
(1  n) ;
2 =
 (v 1   ) +  3 [v(1  )  1]

;
3 =
v 2 +  4 [v(1  )  1]

;
4 =  
ndn (1 + v)
1  n +

v(1  )  1
(1  d)

dnd
1  d +  6

+  5v

:
In turn, we can plug (37), (38), (22) and (23) into (25):38
5q

t =
1
1  n z
n
t  
1
1  d z
d
t  
 
(1 + )
 
cnt   cdt

(40)
38It can be shown that  1    3 =   ( 2    4) =

Mdn
Cd
+ M
nd
Cn + 1
 1
=  < 1:
35
where
5 =
 5    6   
1 + 
 

ndn
(1  n) +
dnd
(1  d)

:
Conditions (39) and (40), together with the Euler conditions for the durable and the
non-durable goods, and the law of accumulation for durable goods, allow us to determine
a system of linear di¤erence equations from which we derive equilibrium dynamics under
exible prices.
APPENDIX D: Log-linear Economy
Here we report the log-linear economy in extensive form:
ecnt = 1  brt   Etnt+1   rrt + Etecnt+1 + (1  )d Etedt+1;
ecnt = 1n (1  )

[1  d (1  )] edt + 11   (1  ) h(n (1  )  1)ecnt + d (1  ) edt   eqti+
  (1  ) 
[1   (1  )]
h
(n (1  )  1)ecnt+1 + d (1  ) edt+1   eqt+1i+
+
edt   edt 1  edt+1   edto
ecdt = 1 edt   1   edt 1;frwnt =  ecnt   (1  )d edt + # (1  )eldt + #+ 1
elnt ;
elnt = frwnt   frwdt + eqt+ eldt ;
nt = Et
n
t+1 +
(1  n) (1  n)
n
grmcnt + nt ;
dt = Et
d
t+1 +
(1  d) (1  d)
d
grmcdt + dt ;
eynt = nnn emnnt + ndn emdnt + (1  n)elnt ;eydt = dnd emndt + ddd emddt + (1  d)eldt ;eynt = CnY necnt + MnnY n emnnt + MndY n emndt ;eydt = CdY decdt + MdnY d emdnt + MddY d emddt ;grmcnt = frwnt + elnt   eynt ;grmcdt = frwdt + eldt   eydt ;grmcnt = emnnt   eynt ;grmcdt = emndt + eqt   eydt ;grmcnt = emdnt   eqt   eynt ;grmcdt = emddt   eydt ;eqt = eqt 1 + nt   dt  qt :
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where  = (1  )n   1.
APPENDIX E: Relative Price in the E¢ cient Equi-
librium with Perfect labor Mobility
We now dene the e¢ cient equilibrium in the model with no frictions in both the goods
and the labor market. On the labor market this condition, obtained for !1, ensures
that nominal salaries are equalized across sectors of the economy:
W n

t = W
d
t = W

t : (41)
Moreover, given the production subsidies that eliminate sectoral distortions due to mo-
nopolistic competition:
P n

t =MC
n
t P
d
t =MC
d
t . (42)
Conditions (41) and (42) imply that:
P n

t =


n
 1
1 nnn  P dt  ndn1 nnn  W t  1 n1 nnn (Znt )  11 nnn ; (43)
P d

t =


d
 1
1 ddd  P nt  dnd1 ddd  W t  1 d1 ddd  Zdt   11 ddd : (44)
We then substitute (43) into (44) to eliminate W

t : 
P n

t
#n
= (1 nnn)(1 d)
 
P d

t
#d (Znt ) (1 d)  Zdt (1 n)
where
 =


n
 1
1 nnn


d
  1
1 d
1 n
1 nnn
and
#n = #d = (1  d) (1  nnn) + (dnd) (1  n) :
Thus, after some trivial algebra we can show that the relative price reads as:
Qt =
P n

t
P d

t
= 
h
(Znt )
 (1 d)  Zdt 1 ni 1{+1
= 
h
(Znt )
 (1 d)  Zdt 1 ni 1{+1 :
where
{ = nd(nn + dd   1)  nnn   ddd:
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APPENDIX F: Second-order Approximation of the
Utility Function
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), we derive a well-dened welfare function
from the utility function of the representative household:
Wt = U (Cnt ; Dt)  V (Lt) :
We start from a second-order approximation of the utility from consumption of durable
and non-durable goods:
U (Cnt ; Dt)  U (Cn; D) + UCn (Cn; D) (Cnt   Cn) +
1
2
UCnCn (C
n; D) (Cnt   Cn)2 (45)
+UD (C
n; D) (Dt  D) + 1
2
UDD (C
n; D) (Dt  D)2 + 1
2
UD (C
n; D) (Dt  Dt 1)2
+UCnD (C
n; D) (Cnt   Cn) (Dt  D) +O
 kk3 ; (46)
where O
 kk3 summarizes all terms of third order or higher. Notice that:
UD (C
n; D) = (dC
n=nD)UCn (C
n; D) ;
UCnCn (C
n; D) = [n (1  )  1] (Cn) 1 UCn (Cn; D) ;
UDD (C
n; D) = [d (1  )  1] (dCn=nD)UCn (Cn; D) ;
UCnD (C
n; D) = d (1  )D 1UCn (Cn; D) :
As C
n
t  Cn
Cn
= bcnt + 12 (bcnt )2, where bcnt = log CntCn is the log-deviation from steady state
under sticky prices, we obtain:
U (Cnt ; Dt)  U (Cn; D) + UCn (Cn; D)Cn
bcnt + 12 (bcnt )2

+
+
1
2
[n (1  )  1]UCn (Cn; D)C
bcnt + 12 (bcnt )2
2
+
+UD (C
n; D)D
bdt + 1
2
bd2t+ 12 [d (1  )  1]UD (Cn; D)D
bdt + 1
2
bd2t2 +
+
1
2
UD (C
n; D)D
bdt   bdt 12 +
+d (1  )UC (Cn; D)Cn
bcnt + 12 (bcnt )2
bdt + 1
2
bd2t+ t.i.p.+O  kk3 ;
where t.i.p. collects terms independent of policy stabilization.
Next, we introduce a second-order approximation to the transition law for the stock
of durables. This will substitute out the linear term for durables in the expression above
(see Erceg and Levin, 2006). The law of motion reads as:
Dt = (1  )Dt 1 +Xt:
For a general function F (Y;X) the second-order Taylor approximation can be written
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as:
F (Y;X)  FY (Y;X)Y y + FX (Y;X)Xx+ 1
2
 
FX (Y;X)X + FXX (Y;X)X
2

x2
+
1
2
 
FY (Y;X)Y + FY Y (Y;X)Y
2

y2 + FY X (Y;X)Y Xxy:
Now, we can rewrite the accumulation equation as:
F (Dt 1; Cdt ) = log

(1  )Dt 1 + Cdt

:
Therefore:
FD =
(1  )
(1  )D + Cd =
(1  )
(1  )D + D =
(1  )
D
;
FCd =
1
(1  )D + Cd =
1
D
;
FDD =   (1  )
2
[(1  )D + Cd]2 =  
(1  )2
D2
;
FCdCd =  
1
[(1  )D + Cd]2 =  
1
D2
;
FDCd =  
1  
[(1  )D + Cd]2 =  
1  
D2
:
Considering that in the steady state Cd = D:
bdt  (1  )
D
D bdt 1 + 1
D
Dbcdt +
+
1
2
"
(1  )
D
D   (1  )
2
D2
D2
# bd2t 1 +
+
1
2

1
D
D   1
D2
D2
 bcdt 2   1  D2 bdt 1bxt
 (1  ) bdt 1 + bcdt + (1  ) 2 bd2t 1 + (1  ) 2  bcdt 2   (1  ) 2 bcdt bdt 1
 (1  ) bdt 1 + bcdt + (1  ) 2 bdt 1   bcdt2 :
Thus:
bdt  (1  ) bdt 1 + bcdt +  t; (47)
where:
b t = (1  ) 2 bcdt   edt 12
=
(1  )
2
bdt   edt 12 :
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Now, let us iterate backward (47), to obtain:
P1
t=0 
t bdt = 1
1   (1  )d0 +
P1
t=0 
t


1   (1  )bcdt + 11   (1  )b t

:
In turn, the term on the RHS will replace the one on the LHS into the intertemporal loss
function.
The next step is to derive a second-order approximation for labor disutility. Recall
that: blt = blnt + (1  )bldt :
Therefore the second-order approximation reads:
V (Lt)  VL (L)L

blnt + (1  )bldt +  (1 + 2)2 blnt 2 + (1  ) [1 + 2 (1  )]2 bldt2

+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk3 :
After these preliminary steps, we need to nd an expression for blnt and bldt . Given the
denition of the marginal cost, in equilibrium we get:
Lnt =
(1  n)MCnt
W nt
1Z
0
Y njtdj =
(1  n)n
Znt
 
Q
 dn
t
RW nt
!n
Y nt
1Z
0

P njt
P nt
 "nt
dj;
Ldt =
(1  d)MCdt
W dt
1Z
0
Y dktdk =
(1  d)d
Zdt

Q
nd
t
RW dt
d
Y dt
1Z
0

P dkt
P dt
 "dt
dk:
Thus, we can report the linear approximation of the expressions above:
blnt =  ndnbqt   ncrwnt   znt + bynt + Snt;bldt = dndbqt   dcrwdt   zdt + bydt + Sdt;
where:
Snt = log
24 1Z
0

P njt
P nt
 "nt
dj
35 Sdt = log
24 1Z
0

P dkt
P dt
 "dt
dk
35 (48)
If we set bpnjt to be the log-deviation of PnjtPnt from its steady state, which means that a
second-order Taylor expansion of
1Z
0

Pnjt
Pnt
 "nt
dj reads as:
1Z
0

P njt
P nt
 "nt
dj 
1Z
0

1  "nbpnjt   "nbpnjtb"nt + 12 ("n)2  bpnjt2

dj +O
 kk3
= 1  "nEibpnjt   "nEibpnjtb"nt + 12 ("n)2Ei  bpnjt2 +O  kk3 ;
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where Eibpnjt  1Z
0
bpnjtdj and Ei  bpnjt2  1Z
0
 bpnjt2 dj. At this stage, we need an expression
for Eibpnjt: Let us start from
P nt =
Z 1
0
 
P njt
1 "nt dj 11 "nt ;
which can be re-arranged as:
1 
1Z
0

P njt
P nt
1 "nt
dj:
Following the procedure above, it can be shown that:
P njt
P nt
1 "nt
 1 + (1  "n) bpnjt   "nbpnjtb"nt + 12 (1  "n)2  bpnjt2 +O  kk3 :
Substituting this into the preceding equations yields:
0 =
1Z
0

(1  "n) bpnjt   "nbpnjtb"nt + 12 (1  "n)2  bpnjt2

dj +O
 kk3 ;
which reduces to:
Eibpnjt = "n   12 Ei  bpnjt2 +O  kk3 :
Thus:
1Z
0

P njt
P nt
 "nt
dj = 1 +
"n
2
Ei
 bpnjt2 +O  kk3 :
Now, notice that:
Ei
 bpnjt2 = Ei h pnjt2   2pnjtpnt + (pnt )2i+O  kk3 ;
where lower case letters denote the log-value of the capital letters. Here we can use a
rst-order approximation of pnt =
1Z
0
pnjtdj, as this term is multiplied by other rst-order
terms each time it appears. With this, we have a second-order approximation:
Ei
 bpnjt2  varjpnjt:
Therefore, the second-order approximation can be represented as:
Snt =
"n
2
varjp
n
jt +O
 kk3 :
Analogous steps in the sector producing durable goods lead us to:
Sdt =
"d
2
varkp
d
kt +O
 kk3 :
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Following Woodford (2003, Ch. 6, Proposition 6.3), we can obtain a correspondence
between cross-sectional price dispersions in the two sectors and their ination rates:
varjp
n
jt = nvarjp
n
jt 1 +
n
1  n (
n
t )
2 +O
 kk3 ;
varkp
d
kt = dvarkp
d
kt 1 +
d
1  d
 
dt
2
+O
 kk3 :
Iterating these expressions forward leads to:
1X
t=0
tvarjp
n
jt = (n)
 1
1X
t=0
t (nt )
2 + t.i.p.+O
 kk3 ; (49)
1X
t=0
tvarkp
d
kt = (d)
 1
1X
t=0
t
 
dt
2
+ t.i.p.+O
 kk3 ; (50)
where
n =
(1  n) (1  n)
n
;
d =
(1  d) (1  d)
d
:
After these preliminary steps, we can write Wt as:
Wt  UCn (Cn; D)Cn
bcnt + 12 [n (1  )] (bcnt )2 + (d=n) bdt +
+
1
2
[d (1  )] (d=n) bd2t + d (1  )bcnt bdt + 12 (d=n)bdt   bdt 12

+
 VL (L)L
n
blnt + (1  )bldt+
+

1 + 
2

2
blnt 2 + (1  )bldt2 + 2 (1  )blnt bldt +
+t.i.p.+O
 kk3 :
We now consider the linear terms in Wt, which are collected under LW t:
LW t = UCn (C
n; D)Cn
n
n
nbcnt + d bdto+
 fVL (L)L ( ndnbqt   ncrwnt + bynt ) +
+ (1  )

dndbqt   dcrwdt + bydt o+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk2 :
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We substitute for the real wage from marginal cost expressions to get:
LW t = UCn (C
n; D)Cn
n
n
nbcnt + d bdto+
 VL (L)L

1
1  n bynt   nnn1  n bmnnt   ndn1  n bmdnt

+
 VL (L)L (1  )

1
1  d bydt   dnd1  d bmndt   ddd1  d bmddt

+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk2 :
After substituting the second-order approximation for the accumulation equation of
durables we get:
1X
t=0
tLW t = UCn (Cn; D)Cn
1X
t=0
t
bcnt + 1   (1  ) dnbcdt

+ (51)
 VL (L)L
1X
t=0
t



1
1  n bynt   nnn1  n bmnnt   ndn1  n bmdnt

+
+(1  )

1
1  d bydt   dnd1  d bmndt   ddd1  d bmddt

+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk2 :
Notice that the following linear approximations for the market clearing conditions hold:
bynt = 1  n nbcnt + nnn bmnnt + (1  n) (1  ) (1  d) dnd bmndt ;bydt = d (1  d)(1  ) [1   (1  )]bcdt + (1  d)(1  ) (1  n)ndn bmdnt + ddd bmddt :
It can be shown that, in the steady state, the following relationships hold:
VLn (L
n)Ln = VL (L)L VLd
 
Ld

Ld = (1  )VLL (L)
Moreover, the presence of production subsidies allows us to express the steady state
marginal rate of substitution between labor supply and consumption of non-durable goods
as:
 VLn (Ln)
UCn (Cn)
=
Y n (1  n)
Ln
;
 VLd
 
Ld

UCn (Cn)
=
Y d (1  d)
LdQ
:
It is now convenient to express the marginal utility from non-durable consumption in
terms of the marginal utility derived from total consumption:
UCn (C
n) = UH (H)Hn:
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Therefore, we can re-write (51) as:
1X
t=0
tLW t = UH (H)H
1X
t=0
t

nbcnt + d1   (1  )bcdt

+
 n

Cn
Y n
 1
(1  n) [ ndnbqt   ncrwnt   znt + bynt ] +
 n

Cn
Y d
 1
(1  d)Q 1
h
dndbqt   dcrwdt   zdt + bydt i
)
+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk2 :
It is now possible to show, given the linearized market clearing conditions in the two
sectors, that
P1
t=0 
tLW t = 0. The linear term in Wt can therefore be dropped. Thus
we are left only with second-order terms:
1X
t=0
tWt  UH (H)H
1X
t=0
t

1  
2

nbcnt + d bdt2 + 11   (1  )db t + d2 bdt   bdt 12 +
 
2
h
"n (n)
 1 (nt )
2 + (1  ) "d (d) 1
 
dt
2i
+
 

1 + 
2

 1

nbcnt + d1   (1  )bcdt
2)
+
+t.i.p.+O
 kk3 ;
where
 =

Cn
Y n
 1
(1  n)n

=
n [1   (1  )] + d
1   (1  ) :
We next consider the deviation of social welfare from its Pareto-optimal level:
1X
t=0
tfWt = 1X
t=0
t (Wt  Wt ) 
 UH (H)H
2

1X
t=0
t

   1


necnt + d edt2 +
+

d
 1 + (1  ) (1  !)  2 edt   edt 12 +
+&
h
$ (nt )
2 + (1 $)  dt 2i+ (1 + ) !ecnt + (1  !)ecdt 2o+ t.i.p.+O  kk3 ;
where the following notation has been introduced:
! =
n [1   (1  )]
n [1   (1  )] + d
;
$ =
"n (n)
 1
&
;
& = 
"n
n
+ (1  ) "
d
d
:
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APPENDIX G: Alternative Policy Regimes
The following alternative period loss functions are considered in Section 4.3:
Strict ination targeting : fWITt =  ITt 2 ;
Gap targeting : fWGTt =  exGTt 2 ;
Flexible ination targeting : fWFITt = fWITt + (1 + v)fWGTt ;
where
ITt = fcoret ; aggt g
coret = $
n
t + (1 $)dt ;
aggt = 
n
t + (1  )dt ;
and
exGTt = fexct ; exptgexct = !ecnt + (1  !)ecdt ;expt = eynt + (1  ) eydt :
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